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The smaller the org, unit or department the less policy is needed.
Reversely, the less policy is used the smaller will become the org, unit or
department.

    One can always  safely  assume,  when  policy  is  available,  that  non
expansion is the direct result  of  the  policy  remaining  unknown  or  not
followed. The steps to take are therefore:

    Expansion formula:

    1. PROVIDE GOOD POLICY.

    2. MAKE IT EASILY KNOWABLE.

    3. BE STRENUOUS IN MAKING SURE IT IS FOLLOWED.

    This is the most broad possible formula for expansion.

    Profitable expansion of a unit,  department,  org,  company,  empire  or
civilization depends utterly on the above formula being applied.

    If it is well applied, literally thousands  of  other  impeding  factors
drop into unimportance.

    This applies to anything, even a person, but the bigger  the  number  of
individuals involved the more rigorously it has to be followed.

    The bigger the size of the activity concerned (the more people  involved
in it) the more damage can result from failures to follow policy.

    Thus orgs or companies which halt expansion mysteriously  only  need  to
have more policy, or to make policy more easily  available  or  to  be  more
vigorous in requiring it to be followed.

    Policy is a guiding thing. It is composed  of  ideas  to  make  a  game,
procedures to be followed in eventualities and deterrents to departures.

    The basic policy of an activity must be the defining and recommending of
a successful and desirable basic purpose.

    Take a Navy, to get a more distant comparison. If a Navy has  the  basic
purpose of defending a nation and its citizens and  expanding  their  scope,
and if the policy is the guiding principle behind all other policies and  if
these in turn are developed from experience and  made  known  and  followed,
then oddly enough even new inventions or new  philosophies  of  state  could
not prevent that Navy from doing its job and expanding the  nation.  The  US
Navy might very well have won the war with Japan in its six weeks  if  those
who headed it in Washington had not been mere political puppets  subject  to
every Congressional and Presidential wlum. The text books  were  very  clear
about what the Navy should do. But King,  Nimitz  and  Short,  the  Admirals
involved, had been chosen by wlum, favoritism and capacity for  liquor,  not
by raw statistics of "good Navy activity".  They  had  been  trained  at  an
Academy where the basic principles of "Good  Navy"  and  raw  statistics  on
personnel had not been used to choose an Academy  head  or  Instructors.  So
King, Nimitz and Short, as Admirals listened to  current  political  rumours
or whims (being only confirmed in political not naval  policy)  and  so  let
Pearl Harbour happen. How? Their own naval text books said "During times  of
negotiation with an unfriendly state, the position of the  fleet  should  be
at sea, whereabouts unknown." That is line  one  of  the  Navy  textbook  on
Tactics and Strategy. Where was it? In Pearl Harbour  during  many  days  of
hostile negotiation between Roosevelt and the  Japanese-the  most  dangerous
naval rival. Where were King and  Nimitz?  At  a  cocktail  party  with  the
politicians. Where was Short? Giving his all ashore, having  given  his  men
full weekend liberty and having ordered all ammunition stowed  below  for  a
coming Admiral's inspection. So Pearl Harbour  could  happen.  But  did  the
humans  learn?  No.  True,  Short,   acting   on   his   Washington   orders
notwithstanding, was removed and eventually court-martialed.  But  King  and
Nimitz took over the whole Navy for more than four  heartbreaking  years  of
"promote by political whim"  "what  policy?"  and  defeat  in  battle  after
battle until aircraft turned the tide of war and the army and an  atom  bomb
finally finished it. Now the Navy is really no  more.  A  few  subs.  A  few
patrol ships. The rest in mothballs. People think  the  Navy  is  small  now
because of new weapons. No, it  is  small  because  it  (a)  didn't  clearly
express its basic purpose, (b) didn't educate its people well in the  policy
it did have, (c) let  political  opinion  shift  it  about,  (d)  chose  its
officers by rumour, cabal and social presence and (e) forgot its texts  when
the emergency loomed. Result, long war, now no Navy  with  anything-officers
palling with men, ships in the bone yard. Could the Navy have done  its  job
in 1941? Yes. Had its original policies regarding officer training and